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THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT IN NORTH DAKOTA—DOES 
IT HAVE ANY RELEVANCE FOR ROYALTY OWNERS? 
CHRISTINE R. FRITZE 
ABSTRACT 
 
The class action lawsuit—having long been a bastion for royalty 
owners seeking an advantage against oil producers—has undergone 
nationwide reforms in recent years.  Most relevant for royalty owners are 
reforms impacting calculation of attorney’s fees, making the class action 
suit a less attractive option for plaintiffs seeking to advance costs.  This 
Article will examine the class action certification procedure, its application 
to the oil patch in North Dakota, and the impact case law has on calculating 
when and how royalty amounts will be determined.  Overall, the Article 
will show it is more likely that North Dakota producers will not face large 
class action challenges in the foreseeable future. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A class action lawsuit for failure to pay royalties properly, often utilized 
by mineral royalty owners as a bastion against the stronger and often better-
financed oil company, has long been successful in states such as Oklahoma, 
 
  Visiting Professor, University of North Dakota 
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but its success has diminished in states such as Texas.  In 2003, Texas’ tort 
reform proved to be a death knell for royalty owner suits.  While much of 
Texas’ revisions dealt with reform to medical malpractice suits, some of the 
most pertinent provisions for royalty owners are those pertaining to the 
award of attorney fees.  The 2003 Act requires that fees be calculated on a 
lodestar basis,1 and that the awarded attorney fees cannot be adjusted higher 
than four times the lodestar.2  In addition for cases where non-cash awards 
are made, the attorneys must receive the same proportion of cash and non-
cash awards as do the class.3 
Class actions suits are very expensive to litigate, both in terms of 
expenses and in time expended by class counsel, as well as for Defendants’ 
counsel but they are typically paid as the suit progresses.  Generally, class 
counsel advance expenses which can amount to hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, if not more.  North Dakota has a unique rule which specifically 
addresses the advancement of costs.  The rule specifies who and when costs 
may be advanced once a class certification is granted.4  While defendants do 
 
1. TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(i)(1) states: In awarding attorney fees, the court must first determine a 
lodestar figure by multiplying the number of hours reasonably worked times a reasonable hourly 
rate.  The attorney fees award must be in the range of 25% to 400% of the lodestar figure.  In 
making these determinations, the court must consider the factors specified in TEX. DISCIPLINARY 
R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.04(b).  Those factors are: 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, 
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular 
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 
services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of 
collection before the legal services have been rendered. 
Stratton v. XTO Energy Inc., No. 02–10–00483–CV2012 WL 407385 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Feb. 
9, 2012). 
2. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 26.003(a). 
3. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 26.003(b) (however, this provision would seldom, if ever, be 
applicable in a royalty class action). 
4. In North Dakota, N.D. R. CIV. P. 23(q) specifically addresses the issue of who may 
advance costs.  The rule reads: 
(1) Before a hearing under Rule 23(b)(1) or at any other time the court directs, the 
representative parties and the attorney for the representative parties must file with the 
court, jointly or separately: 
(A) a statement showing any amount paid or promised them by any person for 
the services rendered or to be rendered in connection with the action and for the 
costs and expenses of the litigation and the source of all of the amounts; 
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attack whether the proffered class representatives will be adequate, North 
Dakota courts appear to have a low threshold for determining adequacy, so 
far as financial ability is concerned.  In Werlinger v. Champion Healthcare 
Corporation, the North Dakota Supreme Court found: 
Typically, courts do not examine the financial resources of a class 
representative.  Without contrary evidence or conduct, an 
affirmative demonstration of willingness or ability to pay will 
suffice.  The record shows the named plaintiffs have already 
advanced money for costs of the litigation.  The district court also 
noted its power to allow advances from class members under Rule 
23(q).  We are unable to say the district court abused its discretion 
in finding adequate financial resources.5 
It does not appear that the North Dakota courts will look beyond the 
plaintiffs’ affirmations that they are willing and able to advance costs. 
Further, class actions typically require many years to litigate.  During 
this time, class counsel are not only typically paying to proceed by 
advancing costs but are also not collecting fees.  Often times, the class 
action litigation is so time consuming little other work can take place at the 
same time.  In the meantime, office overhead still accumulates.  The public 
hears of the enormous windfall these attorneys make when they collect a fee 
in the tens of millions of dollars.  What is not so well appreciated is the risk 
and hardships these men and women go through before, or even if, a payday 
arrives.  If the chance to be highly compensated does not exist, there is no 
incentive to take the risks involved, and a primary attraction for taking on 
these suits is gone. 
 
(B) a copy of any written agreement, or a summary of any oral agreement, 
between the representative parties and their attorneys concerning financial 
arrangements or fees; and 
(C) a copy of any written agreement, or a summary of any oral agreement, by the 
representative parties or the attorneys to share these amounts with a person other 
than a member, regular associate, or an attorney regularly of counsel with that 
law firm.  This statement must be supplemented promptly if additional 
arrangements are made. 
(2) On a determination that the costs and litigation expenses of the action cannot be 
reasonably and fairly defrayed by the representative parties or by other available 
sources, the court may, by order: 
(A) authorize and control the solicitation and expenditure of voluntary 
contributions to defray costs from class members, advances by the attorneys or 
others, or both, subject to reimbursement from any recovery obtained for the 
class; and 
(B) apply any available funds that were contributed or advanced to the payment 
of any costs taxed in favor of a party opposing the class. 
5. Werlinger v. Champion Healthcare Corp., 1999 ND 173, 598 N.W.2d 820, 828.  See In re 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 92 F.R.D. 761, 762 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (requiring plaintiffs to attest they 
would advance costs without requiring any documentary evidence). 
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The oil and gas business was virtually non-existent in North Dakota for 
several decades.  However, with the advent of horizontal drilling and 
advancements in hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) technology, North 
Dakota is now one of the top oil producers in the United States.  Bonuses6 
reach into the hundreds of thousands of dollars and twenty per cent royalty 
lease provisions7 have become commonplace.  As has been historically true, 
when the oil or gas is freely flowing, royalty owners are less likely to bring 
suit against their lessees. 
In the current “oil boom,” money is plentiful and few appear to want to 
complain or rock the boat.  And, because of certain statutes and rulings by 
the North Dakota Supreme Court, even if this were to change, class actions 
are unlikely to gain traction.  This Article will examine the class action 
certification procedure and its application to the oil patch in North Dakota. 
II. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE—RULE 23 AND THE 
CLASS ACTION 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 delineates the requirements a 
federal district court must follow and what plaintiffs must prove in order 
that a class action may be certified.  Should a certification order be granted, 
an interlocutory appeal will certainly follow.8  Therefore, before a case 
reaches the real issues on the merits, much time and effort is expended and 
at least one appeal follows.  However, it is only after this appeal process of 
the certification order when meaningful settlement negotiations can most 
often begin.  Until that time, neither side can fairly determine the risks of 
success or defeat or the possible expanse of the suit.  Both sides need to 
know who will make up the class and which issues the court will certify, or 
 
6. “The leasehold bonus is a one-time payment made to the landowner as consideration for 
executing the negotiated lease.  The amount of the leasehold bonus depends on such factors as the 
proximity of the leased property to other productive property, the length of the lease term, and the 
amount of competition for the lease among prospective lessees.”  Total Petroleum, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 427 N.W.2d 639, 640 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
7. The word “royalty” has a very well understood and definite meaning in mining and oil 
operations.  As thus used, it means a share of the products or profit paid to the owner of the 
property.  See Hinerman v. Baldwin, 215 P. 1103 (Mont. 1923).  In the law of mines and mining 
the term “royalty” signifies that part of the reddendum, which is variable, and depends upon the 
quantity of minerals gotten.  See generally Att’y Gen. of Ontario v. Mercer, (1883) 8 App. Cas. 767 
(Can.); Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 172 S.W. 932 (Ky. 1915); Maloney v. Love, 52 P. 1029 (Colo. 
App. 1898); Kissick v. Bolton, 112 N.W. 95 (Iowa 1907).  It is held that the term has the same 
meaning in oil and gas leases where the lessor is entitled to a share of the product.  See generally 
Horner v. P h i l a d e l p h i a  C o . , 76 S.E. 662 (W. Va. 1912); Ind. Natural Gas Co. v. Stewart, 
90 N.E. 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 1910); Homestake Exploration Corp. v. Schoregge, 264 P. 388 (Mont. 
1928). 
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) provides that an immediate appeal from an order certifying a class 
may be allowed, but that an appeal will not automatically stay the proceedings. 
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not, before advancing further.  Often several years pass from filing of the 
suit to the date of an appellate ruling on the issue of certification, all of 
which happens typically before any real discovery has begun. 
States’ class action procedures generally follow the federal rules, and 
state courts often look to federal decisions for guidance in determining 
whether a class action is appropriate in a given case.  North Dakota is much 
the same with some slight differences.  Under the federal rules, in order to 
certify a class, the trial court must find: 
(1) The proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all members 
is impracticable;  
(2) There are questions of law or fact common to the class;  
(3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 
of the claims or defenses of the class; and  
(4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.9 
In addition to the four elements of Rule 23(a), the federal court must 
find that one of the alternative conditions of Rule 23(b) exists.  Those 
alternatives are: 
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class 
members would create a risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to 
individual members of the class which would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the 
class; or  
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the 
class that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the 
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications 
or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their 
interests; 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting 
the class as a whole; or  
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to 
class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 
 
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
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available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: 
(A) the class members’ interest in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 
controversy already begun by or against class members; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and 
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.10 
In North Dakota, the rule appears slightly different from the federal 
rule, but its application is essentially the same.  North Dakota Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 lists thirteen specific criteria to be considered and (in pertinent 
part) reads: 
(a) Commencement of a class action.  One or more members of a 
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all 
in a class action if: 
(1) the class is so numerous or so constituted that joinder of all 
members, whether or not otherwise required or permitted, is 
impracticable; and 
(2) a question of law or fact is common to the class. 
(b) Certification of class action. 
(1) Unless deferred by the court, as soon as practicable after 
the commencement of a class action the court must: 
(A) hold a hearing and determine whether or not the 
action is to be maintained as a class action; and 
(B) certify or refuse to certify it as a class action by order. 
(2) The court may certify an action as a class action if it finds 
that: 
(A) the requirements of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied; 
(B) a class action should be permitted for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of the controversy; and 
(C) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class. 
(3) If appropriate, the court may: 
 
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
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(A) certify an action as a class action with respect to a 
particular claim or issue; 
(B) certify an action as a class action to obtain one or 
more forms of equitable, declaratory, or monetary relief; 
or 
(C) divide a class into subclasses and treat each subclass 
as a class. 
(c) Criteria considered. 
(1) In determining whether the class action should be 
permitted for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy, as appropriately limited under Rule 23(b)(3), the 
court must consider, and give appropriate weight to, the 
following and other relevant factors: 
(A) whether a joint or common interest exists among class 
members; 
(B) whether prosecuting separate actions by or against 
individual class members would create a risk of 
inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to 
individual class members that would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct for a party opposing 
the class; 
(C) whether adjudications with respect to individual class 
members as a practical matter would be dispositive of the 
interests of other members not parties to the adjudication 
or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect 
their interests; 
(D) whether a party opposing the class has acted or 
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, 
so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 
relief is appropriate with respect to the class as a whole; 
(E) whether common questions of law or fact predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual members; 
(F) whether other means of adjudicating the claims and 
defenses are impracticable or inefficient; 
(G) whether a class action offers the most appropriate 
means of adjudicating the claims and defenses; 
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(H) whether members not representative parties have a 
substantial interest in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; 
(I) whether the class action involves a claim that is or has 
been the subject of a class action, a government action, or 
other proceeding; 
(J) whether it is desirable to bring the class action in 
another forum; 
(K) whether management of the class action poses 
unusual difficulties; 
(L) whether any conflict of laws issues involved pose 
unusual difficulties; and 
(M) whether the claims of individual class members are 
insufficient in the amounts or interests involved, in view 
of the complexities of the issues and the expenses of the 
litigation, to afford significant relief to the class 
members.11 
A substantive difference between the federal rule and the North Dakota 
rule appears to be found in North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(c)(1)(M).  This provision appears to be in stark opposition to why most 
class actions are brought.  In fact, federal jurisprudence specifically speaks 
to this issue and has consistently found that one of the basic rationales for 
the class action is to allow a mechanism for small claims to be brought in 
such a way as to provide relief where any one of the claims would not be of 
sufficient size to justify suit.12 
A review of North Dakota jurisprudence does not reveal any class 
action which was determined by, or even addressed, the application of Rule 
23(c)(1)(M).  Nor has there been one where an absent class member 
attacked, successfully or otherwise, the procedure by advancing this 
provision.  However, the North Dakota Supreme Court has specifically 
found that not all of the thirteen factors listed in Rule 23(c)(1) need be 
considered and that, when considered, some may weigh more heavily in favor 
of certification, while others may not.13  It appears at this point, subsection 
 
11. N.D. R. CIV. P. 23(a)-(c). 
12. The class suit is designed to “provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress 
for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation.”  Eisen v. Carlisle 
& Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968). 
13. See generally Peterson v. Dougherty Dawkins, Inc., 1998 ND 159, 583 N.W.2d 626. 
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M is of little consequence in determining whether a class will be certified in 
North Dakota. 
III. THE ISSUE OF COMMANALITY 
In the realm of oil and gas royalty owners’ class actions, a consistently 
uniform initial defense is lack of commonality.  In the majority of cases, the 
issue is glossed over and has seldom served to defeat an oil and gas royalty 
class certification motion.  Primarily this is true because lessees, while 
complaining in the suit of the necessity of reviewing each lease for specific 
contract language, do not themselves pay according to the language of each 
lease.  Virtually without exception, regardless of whether the lease 
provides royalty calculation via “market value,” “gross proceeds,” “net 
proceeds,” or any of several other possibilities, historically the accounting 
method in which royalty is calculated is identical.  Therefore, the majority 
of courts, looking at the defendant’s conduct, find that commonality is not 
defeated by differing lease language.  For example, in Farrar v. Mobil Oil 
Corporation,14 the appellate court stated the result this way: 
Under the facts of this case, where a purported class action claims 
improper deductions in calculating royalties under oil and gas 
leases, there is no need for individualized examination of lease 
formation or the intent of the parties thereto for purposes of 
determining predominance of common issues or manageability in 
certification proceedings where there has been shown a systemic 
common course of conduct by an oil and gas lessee in calculating 
royalties payable pursuant to leases to explore and 
develop . . . minerals.15 
However, there is a growing minority of courts which are scrutinizing 
this issue more carefully.  In 2012, Stephen P. Friot,16 United States 
District Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma, refused to certify a 
class on the basis of lack of commonality.  Judge Friot explained: 
Even a single common question will satisfy the commonality 
requirement. But as the court pointed out in Dukes, the 
commonality language of Rule 23(a) is easy to misread, since 
[a]ny competently crafted class complaint literally raises common 
‘questions.’  The common contention which the plaintiff seeks to 
litigate on behalf of the proposed class must be of such a nature 
 
14. 234 P.3d 19 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010). 
15. Id. at 22. 
16. The Honorable Stephen P. Friot is a 2002 George W. Bush appointee. 
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that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that 
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is 
central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.  This 
is because:  What matters to class certification . . . is not the 
raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves—but, rather the 
capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers 
apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.  Dissimilarities within 
the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the 
generation of common answers.17 
He concluded his analysis by quoting Chief Judge Miles LaGrange: 
The Court finds that the varying terms of the hundreds of leases, 
relating to matters such as the method for calculating royalty, 
allowance for post-production charges or fuel use and affiliate 
sales demonstrate the inability to adjudicate the claims of the 
named plaintiff and expect the same result to apply to all members 
of the proposed class.  The Court finds plaintiff has failed to 
identify issues of fact or law that are truly common to all persons 
included within the class definition, or to demonstrate that, if 
certification was granted, that this case could proceed as a class 
and reliably ‘generate common answers apt to drive the resolution 
of the litigation.’ 18 
North Dakota has only had two occasions to determine whether 
certification of a class of oil and gas royalty owners was proper.  In the first, 
Ritter, Laber and Associates v. Koch Oil, Incorporated,19 (“Ritter 1”) the 
North Dakota Supreme Court considered an order certifying a class of 
royalty and leasehold interests owners who complained that Koch Oil, 
Incorporated had not paid proper royalties.  However, the issue was much 
simpler than most, as the disputed activity was alleged inaccurate 
measurement of oil by hand gauging over a period of approximately thirteen 
years.  Thus, royalty for the entire class was alleged to be based on a base 
amount which was too low.  The court affirmed the certification order 
stating: 
 
17. Foster v. Merit Energy Co., 282 F.R.D. 541, 546 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  In his opinion, Friot also provides a good history of the development of 
the ‘marketable product rule’ in Oklahoma jurisprudence.  See Richard A. Nagareda, Class 
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009). 
18. Id. at 560 (quoting Tucker v. BP Amer. Prod. Co., 278 F.R.D. 646, 654 (W.D. Okla. 
2011).  See also Morrison v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 280 F.R.D. 621 (W.D. Okla. 2012). 
19. 2000 ND 15, 605 N.W.2d 153. 
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We explained . . . that when a question of law refers to 
standardized conduct by the defendants toward members of a 
proposed class, a common nucleus of operative facts is typically 
presented, and the commonality requirement is met.  Individual 
differences in cases concerning treatment or damages do not 
defeat commonality. 
The district court found common questions existed: 
The claims of all the potential class members arise from the same 
alleged conduct by Koch . . . . There is a single type of transaction: 
the purchase of North Dakota crude oil at the well by Koch.  There 
is also a single purchaser involved, Koch and a single commodity 
oil.  All North Dakota Koch purchase practices were managed 
through one office located in Belfield, North Dakota. 
Indeed, the representatives, who represent persons and entities 
owning royalty interests and leasehold interests in wells only in 
North Dakota, allege Koch took more oil than it paid for in 
transactions at the well, in which hand-gauging was used to 
measure the oil purchased.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding a question of law or fact common to the 
class.20 
Here, the North Dakota Supreme Court focused on the behavior of the 
defendant in determining commonality.  However, it is a much clearer 
choice when the question is one of how much raw product is produced 
rather than whether the royalty is properly calculated on that product. 
In the second case, Bice v. Petro-Hunt, LLC21 (“Bice 1”), the issue 
alleged by the class representatives was based on the allegation that Petro-
Hunt is required to “to produce and deliver a marketable product” before 
any deductions can be made from royalty.22  First, the Supreme Court noted 
a policy “to provide an open and receptive attitude toward class actions.”23  
Petro-Hunt defended against the certification by raising the issue of differing 
lease provisions which obviate a “common question of law or fact,” or 
commonality.24  The proposed class representatives countered with the usual 
proposition, regardless of the lease, everyone is paid the same mantra.25  
The court sided with the royalty owners recognizing, “Petro-Hunt’s 
 
20. Id. ¶¶ 7-9. 
21. 2004 ND 113, 681 N.W.2d 74. 
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standardized conduct toward the royalty owners presents a common nucleus 
of operative facts meeting the commonality requirement . . . .”26  This issue 
on the merits of whether North Dakota will adopt the Texas or the 
Oklahoma position on the first marketable product rule was not addressed 
in Bice 1.  Thus, North Dakota has gone the way of the majority position on 
this issue of commonality. 
IV. THE FIRST MARKETABLE PRODUCT RULE 
The issue, which is one of the most polarized between Texas and 
Oklahoma jurisprudence and which relates to the calculation of royalty, is 
the “first marketable product rule.”  It is also the rule which provides a 
solid basis for royalty disputes in jurisdictions where the rule is recognized.  
It generally proves to be a class action non-starter for plaintiffs in those 
jurisdictions which do not recognize the rule. 
Oil and gas leases do not commonly contain many explicit covenants.  
However, courts have found various implied covenants exist vis-a-vis the 
relationship of the lessor and lessee.  One of these implied covenants is the 
“duty to market.”27  This implied duty to market includes the duty to market 
at an appropriate price.  It has been explained that the “lessee under oil and 
gas leases . . . has an implied duty and obligation in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, as a prudent operator, with due regard for the interest 
of both lessor and lessee, to obtain a market for the gas . . . at the prevailing 
market price therefor.”28 
Because a royalty interest is a non-cost bearing interest, an important 
question raised in relationship to this implied covenant is when can a 
producer begin to deduct post-production costs associated with the 
production of oil and/or gas?  As a result, the “first-marketable product 
rule” developed in some jurisdictions.  In Texas, the question is first 
answered by legal definition that oil and gas is “produced” upon severance 
from the land, or at the wellhead.29  The ultimate question of what 
constitutes a “post-production” expense, which is then legally chargeable to 
the royalty, is explained by the court in Martin v. Glass: 
 
26. Id. 
27. Cook v. Tompkins, 713 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. App. 1986) (citing 5 WILLIAMS & 
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 853, 855). 
28. Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 119, 125 (W.D. Okla. 1969) (citing 
Gazin v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1961)); see generally Harding v. 
Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466 (D. Okla. 1963); Townsend v. Creekmore-Rooney Co., 358 P.2d 1103 
(Okla. 1960); Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964)). 
29. Martin v. Glass, 571 F. Supp. 1406, 1415 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (citing Lone Star Gas Co. v. 
Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. App. 1962)). 
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It is well recognized and acknowledged that the working interest 
operator has a duty to market the product once production has 
been achieved.  This is true when the royalty is payable in money 
(as opposed to in kind) because the royalty owner is so dependent 
upon the lessee in order to realize his royalty return.  However, the 
duty to market is a separate and independent step, once or more 
removed from production, and as such is a post-production 
expense, and the lessee is entitled to a pro rata reimbursement.30 
In Texas, a producer may deduct any costs associated with putting a 
product into marketable form.  “Whatever costs are incurred after 
production of the gas or minerals are normally proportionately borne by 
both the operator and the royalty interest owners . . . [including] taxes, 
treatment costs to render the gas marketable, compression costs to make it 
deliverable into a purchaser’s pipeline, and transportation costs.”31  When 
there is no market at the well, the value of production for the determination 
of royalties is accomplished either through the comparable sales method or 
the net-back method.32  In Heritage Resources v. Nationsbank, the court 
explained: 
There are two methods to determine market value at the well.  The 
most desirable method is to use comparable sales.  A comparable 
sale is one that is comparable in time, quality, quantity, and 
availability of marketing outlets.  Courts use the second method 
when information about comparable sales is not readily available. 
This method involves subtracting reasonable post-production 
marketing costs from the market value at the point of sale.  Post-
production marketing costs include transporting the gas to the 
market and processing the gas to make it marketable.  With either 
method, the plaintiff has the burden to prove market value at the 
well.33 
There are other causes of action which a Texas plaintiff might bring in 
a class action, such as reasonableness of deductions and perhaps affiliate 
transaction issues.  However, without the “first marketable product rule” 
and with the limit set on attorneys’ fees, class actions are less attractive to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and are less likely to be brought in Texas.  On the other 
hand, Oklahoma still provides fertile ground for class action plaintiffs.  
Prior to determining what position Oklahoma would take on the first 
 
30. 571 F. Supp. 1406, 1415, (N.D. Tex. 1983) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
31. Occidental Permian LTD v. French, 391 S.W.3d 215, 223 (Tex. App. 2012). 
32. Id. at 220. 
33. 939 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex. 1996) (internal citations omitted). 
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marketable product rule, the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed a similar, 
but more limited question concerning deductions of costs from the royalty 
portion of production.  In 1970, in Johnson v. Jernigan,34 the court took up 
the limited question of when transportation costs may be deducted.  In 
Johnson, the lease provision at question was as follows, “[t]o pay lessor for 
gas from each well for gas only as found, the equal one eight [sic] (1/8) of 
the gross proceeds at the prevailing market rate for all gas sold off the 
premises.”35  The court first recognized where the “market rate” is to be 
determined, “[it is the market rate at the wellhead or in the field that 
determines the sale price, and not the market rate at the purchaser’s location 
which may be some distance away from the lease premises.”36  The 
common problem is that any sale may actually take place miles away, here 
ten miles.37  Thus, the issue becomes whether the lessor may deduct a 
proportionate share of the transportation costs to transport gas away from 
the lease to the place of sale. 
The court in Johnson reasoned that while a lessee must reasonably 
develop a commodity to bring the best possible price, that duty does not 
include the expense of providing off lease pipelines.38  The court then 
stated: 
‘[G]gross proceeds’ has reference to the value of the gas on the 
lease property without deducting any of the expenses involved in 
developing and marketing the dry gas to this point of delivery. 
When the lessee has made the gas available for market then his 
sole financial obligation ceases, and any further expenses beyond 
the lease property must be borne proportionately by the lessor and 
lessee.39 
Finally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that a lessee’s duty to 
market ceases once the gas is available for market, after which any 
expenses incurred off the lease may be charged proportionately to the 
lessor.40 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court later addressed the larger question of 
marketability and whether a royalty owner can be charged with a 
proportionate share of the costs required to compress the gas to a sufficient 
 
34. 475 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1970). 
35. Johnson, 475 P.2d at 396. 
36. Id. at 398 (citing Katschor v. Eason Oil Co., 63 P.2d 977 (Okla. 1936); Cimarron Utils. 
Co. v. Safranko, 101 P.2d 258 (Okla. 1940)). 
37. Id. at 397-98. 
38. Id. at 399. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
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pressure in order that the gas enter a purchaser’s lines as a certified question 
in the federal diversity action Wood v. TXO Production Corporation.41  In 
Wood, the court recognized that Texas and Louisiana have taken a different 
approach to analyzing the lessee’s implied duty to market resulting in what 
constitute “post production” costs.42  The Oklahoma Supreme Court then 
chose to follow the Kansas and Arkansas rule.  The court explained: 
We interpret the lessee’s duty to market to include the cost of 
preparing the gas for market.  The lessor, who generally owns the 
minerals, grants an oil and gas lease, retaining a smaller interest, in 
exchange for the risk-bearing working interest receiving the larger 
share of proceeds for developing the minerals and bearing the 
costs thereof.  Part of the mineral owner’s decision whether to 
lease or to become a working interest owner is based upon the 
costs involved.  We consider also that working interest owners 
who share costs under an operating agreement have input into the 
cost-bearing decisions.  The royalty owners have no such input 
after they have leased.  In effect, royalty owners would be sharing 
the burdens of working interest ownership without the attendant 
rights.43 
The court then pronounced that in Oklahoma, “the lessee’s duty to market 
involves obtaining a marketable product.”44 
The decision opened the door for class action lawsuits to be filed, most 
of which result in settlement, for, while settlement is not probable before an 
appeal of the class certification order, it is much more likely to happen 
before trial.  Oil companies rarely want to risk putting the issue in front of 
a jury, who are often more inclined to rule in favor of the local mineral 
owner.  In 1998, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Mittelstaedt v. 
Santa Fe Minerals.45  Mittelstaedt provides a thorough history of the 
development of the rule in Oklahoma and reviews both Kansas’ and 
Colorado’s position.  In the end, the court provided a rule for when post—
production costs may be charged to the royalty. 
In sum, a royalty interest may bear post-production costs of 
transporting, blending, compression, and dehydration, when the 
costs are reasonable, when actual royalty revenues increase in 
proportion to the costs assessed against the royalty interest, when 
 
41. 854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992). 
42. Id. at 882. 
43. Id. at 882-83. 
44. Id. at 883. 
45. 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998). 
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the costs are associated with transforming an already marketable 
product into an enhanced product, and when the lessee meets its 
burden of showing these facts.46 
 However, the ruling actually raises issues beyond the basic question 
answered.  What is a “reasonable” cost and what does “when actual revenue 
increases in proportion to the cost assessed against the royalty interest” 
mean?  These are questions still open for debate. 
V. INTEREST ON LATE PAYMENTS 
Another issue in Oklahoma, which does not lead to large damage 
amounts, but is worth mentioning because it provides a solid legal claim 
easily proven and has little defense when alleged appropriately, is interest 
due for paying royalties after the statutory mandated period.  The 
Oklahoma Production Revenue Standards Act (“PRSA”)47 explicitly 
describes when royalty is due to be paid to lessors and the penalties for 
failing to comply with the statute.  Once a well is completed, an operator 
has six months to begin to pay royalties.48  Thereafter, payment has to be 
made “not later than the last day of the second succeeding month after the 
end of the month within which such production is sold[,]”49 essentially 
within sixty days of production.  Should the operator fail to comply with the 
statute, the resulting penalty is the requirement of paying twelve percent 
interest, which is calculated from the date of first sale, not from the date the 
payment is first due.50  However, an exception is allowed if there is a 
question of who is the proper party to be paid (i.e., a marketable title 
issue).51  The late interest payment rate is then only six percent.52  The 
PRSA now specifically provides that interest is to be compounded, but only 
annually.53  This provision echoes a previous ruling by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court which also determined that interest accrued under the act 
was to be compounded annually.54 
As stated earlier, interest on late payments does not result in a huge 
windfall for a class of royalty owners.  However, when the circumstances 
 
46. Id. at 1210. 
47. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52 § 570.1 et seq. (2013). 
48. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52 § 570.10(B)(1)(a) (2013). 
49. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52 § 570.10(B)(1)(b) (2013). 
50. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52 § 570.10(D)(1) (2013). 
51. Id. 
52. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52 § 570.10(D)(2) (2013). 
53. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52 § 570.10(D)(1). 
54. Maxwell v. Samson Res. Co., 848 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Okla. 1993) (the trial court in 
Maxwell had compounded the interest monthly). 
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exist, it does provide a claim which has no defense, except perhaps a lower 
rate of interest, and also provides a basis to recover attorney fees.55  When 
other claims may be more tenuous and may be based in tort, having a 
baseline claim which bears attorney fees is always a good starting point for 
class action plaintiffs. 
VI. NORTH DAKOTA ROYALTY OWNER CLASS ACTIONS 
The case of Ritter, Laber and Associates. v. Koch Oil, Incorporated, is 
a good example of:  (1) how arduous prosecuting a class action can be; (2) 
how a case can take on a life of its own; and (3) how very long such cases 
can last.  Ritter resulted in four appeals, the last of which concluded in 2007 
and which actually occurred after a settlement was reached.56  The original 
case was filed in 1996.57  Eleven years passed before the class counsel 
received a paycheck.  However, the story even began before then as the 
class action emanated from the case of Koch Oil Company v. Hanson, a 
North Dakota tax commission case.58  The Ritter case is not instructive here 
except as an example of an appeal of a certification order and how tortured 
these cases are. 
On the other hand, Bice v. Petro-Hunt, LLC59 (“Bice 2”), the only other 
oil and gas royalty class action case which has made it through appeal in 
North Dakota, is exactly on point.  Bice 1, as discussed earlier, concerned 
the certification of a royalty owner class action.  Petro-Hunt argued that 
because there were at least two different lease royalty clauses, the trial court 
had erred in its finding of commonality.  The trial court agreed with the 
plaintiffs’ position finding: 
This court is convinced that the precedential effect of this litigation 
combined with the history of treating all the royalty owners the 
same would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of 
other members not parties to this action or substantially impair or 
impede their ability to protect their interests.  The present action 
also seeks declaratory relief and not just money damages.  The 
 
55. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52 § 570.14(A) (2013). 
56. Ritter 1—Ritter, Laber & Assocs. v. Koch Oil, Inc., 2000 ND 15, 605 N.W.2d 153; Ritter 
2—Ritter, Laber & Assocs. v. Koch Oil, Inc., 2001 ND 56, 623 N.W.2d 424; Ritter 3—Ritter, 
Laber & Assocs. v. Koch Oil, Inc., 2007 ND 163, 740 N.W.2d 67; Ritter 4—Ritter, Laber & 
Assocs. v. Koch Oil, Inc., 2007 ND 163, 740 N.W.2d 67. 
57. Ritter, ¶ 3, 605 N.W.2d at 155. 
58. 536 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 1995) (North Dakota State Tax Commission appealed from 
district court judgment that reversed the Commission’s 1993 order allowing assessment of 
additional oil extraction taxes and gross production taxes, penalties, and interest against Koch).  
Id. at 704. 
59. 2009 ND 124, 768 N.W.2d 496. 
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request for declaratory relief also supports the plaintiffs’ argument 
that adjudication as a practical matter could be dispositive of the 
interests of non-parties.60 
The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the trial court.61  A 
round one win for the plaintiffs.  Unfortunately for the class, they did not 
fare as well four years later in round two.  The issue in the second appeal 
was whether North Dakota will follow Texas or Oklahoma in the 
application of the first marketable product rule.  In Bice 2, the trial court 
granted Petro-Hunt summary judgment and determined that the defendant 
could properly calculate royalties on the basis of a “work-back” method.62  
The court stated that “[b]ecause the gas here has no discernible market value 
at the well, the district commercially reasonable processing costs can be 
deducted before royalties are calculated.”63  The facts in the case showed 
that the gas at issue was “sour,” as it contained hydrogen sulfide and 
contained other valuable constituents in the gas stream, all of which had to 
be removed before the sweet gas could be placed into an interstate gas 
pipeline.64 
The sour gas was processed off the leases at the Little Knife Gas Plant 
and sold at the tailgate of the plant.65  The class argued: 
[t]he lease language “market value at the well” supports an 
adoption of the first marketable product rule because the 
casinghead gas produced at the wells is not marketable until after 
it is processed.  Thus, . . . the logical interpretation of the lease 
language is to pay royalty on the market value of the gas after it has 
been made marketable.66 
 The evidence in this case showed that Petro-Hunt created a wellhead 
value for purposes of calculating royalty by “working back” from a point 
where the gas has an established market value—in this case at the tailgate 
of the processing plant.67  “The work-back calculation deducts post-
wellhead costs (aggregating, gathering, compressing, treating, dehydrating, 
processing, and conditioning) from the sales price of the gas, thus arriving 
 
60. Bice v. Petro-Hunt, LLC, 2004 ND 113, ¶ 15, 681 N.W.2d 74, 79.  The royalty 
calculation was also subject to an earlier 1983 royalty agreement with a group of royalty owners. 
61. Id. at 82. 
62. Bice, 768 N.W.2d at 499. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 500. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Brief for Appellant ¶ 32, Bice v. Petro-Hunt, LLC, 2009 ND 124, 768 N.W.2d 496 (No. 
20080265). 
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at a “fictitious” wellhead value.”68  This method, the class argued, was 
susceptible to abuse because how far upstream Petro-Hunt could go in order 
to “work-back” was open to interpretation.69  In their initial brief on appeal, 
the class proffered: 
When the work-back method is used to deduct costs incurred to 
obtain marketable gas, the method emasculates the plain meaning 
of the term “market value” as well as the plain meaning of the 
terms ‘market price,’ and ‘proceeds.’  By Petro-Hunt’s witnesses’ 
testimony, the gas is not marketable until it reaches the plant 
tailgate.  Accordingly, Representatives submit that these 
deductions must stop at the point upstream where a marketable 
product is first obtained, which in this case, by Petro-Hunt’s 
witnesses’ testimony, is at the tailgate of the processing plant.  
Thus, no deductions are permitted in this particular situation.70 
The class argued that by applying the plain language of the contract, or in 
the alternative, by construing the contract against the drafter, market value 
is what is acquired upon sell and no deductions should be allowed prior to 
this point.71 
While acknowledging the “unsettled nature of the law” concerning the 
issue of “market value at the well,” the North Dakota Supreme Court 
recognized that the majority of jurisdictions take a literal approach to “at the 
well” meaning “at the wellhead”.72  The Court went on to adopt the majority 
position.  Just as the plaintiffs had argued that how far “upstream” a 
producer should be able to go before beginning to deduct costs, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that determining when a product has 
become marketable can be difficult to determine.73  In the end, the Court 
adopted the Texas rule and rejected the first marketable product rule.74  By 
doing so, the plaintiffs’ win of the previous appeal on class certification 
became a hollow victory. 
 
68. Id. 
69. Id. ¶ 33. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. ¶ 37. 
72. Bice, ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 500-01. 
73. Id. ¶ 17, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
74. Id.  The class also made arguments concerning the appropriateness of certain calculations 
made by Petro-Hunt.  The Supreme Court also agreed with the trial court in granting Petro-Hunt 
summary judgment on these issues. 
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VII. INTEREST ON LATE PAYMENT IN NORTH DAKOTA 
In determining when interest for paying royalties late is due, the 
legislature in North Dakota is much more generous to producers as to 
timely payment than is Oklahoma.  In North Dakota, a producer has 150 
days after the product is marketed in which to pay their lessees any royalty 
due.75  Therefore, a producer may use the lessor’s money interest free for 
149 days.  However, if paid late, the rate of interest is eighteen percent, 
which is six percent higher than Oklahoma’s rate.76  But, unlike Oklahoma 
where six percent interest is due on payments withheld because of a title 
issue, if a North Dakota producer does not pay a royalty because of a 
question of marketable title, no interest is ever due. 
Additionally, North Dakota, like Oklahoma, specifically speaks to the 
issue of the availability of an award of attorney’s fees in a late payment 
claim.77  Unfortunately, the statute is not clear on the starting date for the 
calculation of interest or whether the interest will be compounded.  It reads:  
“. . . the operator thereafter shall pay interest on the unpaid royalties . . . at 
the rate of eighteen percent per annum until paid.”78  Because of the use of 
the word “thereafter,” the producer will be able to argue that the calculation 
should only begin to calculate on the 151st day. 
In summary, when in North Dakota, a producer has longer to pay but a 
higher penalty due for late payment.  Where does that leave royalty owners?  
The most likely answer is few claims for interest only will be made, 
especially in a class setting.  Without the larger overall claim of failing to 
calculate royalties properly, the late interest claim is unlikely to be brought 
alone.  Seldom are class actions driven by a claim of failing to timely pay.  
When the claim does exist, it is the claim that clearly prevents dismissal on 
summary judgment and gives class counsel some comfort in knowing they 
have a claim which is bullet proof.  However, it is not a claim which can 
likely sustain the class action. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Class actions are a tough business—they are very expensive and time 
consuming.  In strong economic times, royalty owners do not go clamoring 
to bite the hands that feed them.  In North Dakota, oil production is at an 
all-time high.  Parties on all sides are reaping huge financial benefits.  There 
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appears to be little interest in ferreting out on what basis royalty is being 
determined by producers and whether that basis is being calculated correctly.  
Without the first marketable product rule, possible class claims in North 
Dakota are most likely relegated to arguing whether certain marketing 
decisions and/or cost calculations are reasonable, which is not really a 
position class action counsel wants to be in.  It appears that North Dakota 
producers need not lose much sleep over concerns of whether their lessors 
will be filing class actions any time in the near future. 
